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Photo of John Montgomery Ward, 1922, Bain Collection, Library of Congress.

JOHN MONTGOMERY WARD:
THE LAWYER WHO TOOK ON BASEBALL
Christopher W. Schmidt

A

s 1888 drew to a close, John
Montgomery Ward stood
atop the world of professional baseball. The star shortstop
had just led the New York Giants
to the National League pennant, followed by a triumph over the St. Louis
Browns of the rival American Association in what even then went by
the inflated title of baseball’s “World
Series.” A dominating pitcher early
in his career (he threw the second
perfect game in major league history), an arm injury forced Ward
to recreate himself as an infielder,
where he became one of the best
fielders and hitters of his era. He was
lauded in the press as a ballplayer

with “few equals and no superiors,”
and “by long odds the most popular player in the profession.” These
accomplishments would eventually
earn Ward a place in the Baseball
Hall of Fame.
Ward’s skills on the ball field were
only a part of what made him such a
remarkable figure. Contemporaries
and historians alike have struggled to
describe him. One adjective-happy
biographer took the saturation approach: he was a “jug-eared, willowy,
peach-fuzzed, overreaching punk”
as well as “honorable, smart, and tenacious.” More admired than liked
seems to have been the consensus
view of Ward contemporaries. In a
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profession not known for intellectualism, he stood out. Although Ward
left school at the age of thirteen in
order to pursue his baseball career,
he eventually earned, in his spare
time, degrees in political science and
law from Columbia. He was said to
speak five languages. A regular contributor to newspapers and periodicals, in 1888 he published Baseball:
How to Become a Player, which he
described as a “handbook of the
game, a picture of the play as seen by
a player.”
Ward was also a pioneering labor
leader. In 1885, he established America’s first sports union, the Brotherhood of Professional Base Ball
Players. Initially designed to help
sick, injured, or hard-up ballplayers
and promote professional standards,
the Brotherhood quickly evolved
into something approaching a craft
union for ballplayers. Ward had forward-looking attitudes on race as
well. At a time when the color line
was hardening in American society,
and organized baseball had become
a whites-only affair, Ward urged the
Giants to sign an African-American
pitcher.
If all this wasn’t enough, Ward’s
social life was also noteworthy. In
1887 he married a New York actress
and socialite, Helen Dauvray, who
also happened to be a passionate
baseball fan. “Her tiny hands beat
each other rapturously at every victory of the Giants and her dark eyes
were bedewed at every defeat,” re-
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ported the New York Times. “But
the thousands of spectators who observed Miss Dauvray’s emotions little suspected that one of the Giants
had any precedence over the others
so far as her affections were concerned.” She had donated the Tiffany
trophy that went to the World Series
champion; it was the “Dauvray Cup”
that her husband brought home at
the end of the 1888 season. In How
to Become a Player, the ever gallant
Ward included a chapter explaining
the basics of the game “for the benefit of those ladies whose escorts either cannot, or will not, answer their
questions.” He also offered advice for
his gentleman readers: “Whoever
has not experienced the pleasure of
taking a young lady to her first game
of ball should seize the first opportunity to do so.”
Life was not all three-hit games
and celebrity life for the great Monte Ward, however. His relationship
with Helen Dauvray was strained
almost from the start. He was carrying on an affair, and she knew it; she
wanted to return to the stage, and he
didn’t want her to. They lived together for only a year and soon divorced.
His baseball career too was about
to veer off in some unexpected directions. Following his World Series triumph, Ward captained a team of National League all-stars that traveled
around the globe between October
1888 and April 1889 in an effort to
promote the game overseas. It was a
grand gesture, fitting for an emerg-
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ing era of American nationalism
and confidence on the international
scene. But the world tour also helped
set in motion one of the most significant upheavals in baseball’s history.
The man who organized and led the
tour around the globe was Albert
Goodwill Spalding. Soon after they
returned home, he and Ward would
face off in an epic struggle for the future of the game.
Spalding, a star pitcher in his
younger years, now owned the Chicago White Stockings of the NaJohn M. Ward, New York Giants baseball card portrait, 1887, Library of Congress. Facing: Photo of
Albert Goodwill Spalding, 1910, Bain Collection,
Library of Congress.

tional League in addition to a burgeoning sporting goods empire. The
game never had a more effective and
more passionate salesman. Baseball,
he once wrote, captured the nation
because “it is the exponent of American Courage, Confidence, Combativeness; American Dash, Discipline,
Determination; American Energy,
Eagerness, Enthusiasm; American
Pluck, Persistency, Performance;
American Spirit, Sagacity, Success;
American Vim, Vigor, Virility.”
(Spalding also basically created baseball’s all-American birth myth, which
conveniently featured a future Civil
War hero, Abner Doubleday, in 1839
dreaming up the game in bucolic
Cooperstown, New York. In fact,
baseball had largely evolved from
various children’s games; if it ever
had a proper birth moment, it was
among young professionals in 1840s
New York City.) Spalding envisioned
the world tour as an opportunity to
sell two things he loved above all:
the game of baseball and the equipment that bore his name. Despite his
background as a player, and despite
his overwrought romanticism about
the national pastime, Spalding approached his role as a team owner
from the perspective of the captain
of industry that he had become: the
players were employees, and comfortably paid ones at that; and it was
the owner’s job to control costs and
ensure a compliant workforce. Needless to say, he didn’t think much of
Ward’s efforts with the Brotherhood.
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T

he world tour had just reached
Cairo, Egypt, in February 1889
when the players received news that,
at their winter meetings in New
York, the National League owners
had adopted a major reform designed to reign in player salaries.
They created a player classification
system under which “Class A” players earned $2,500, “Class B” players
$2,250, and so on, down to “Class E”
players who earned $1,500. The classifications scheme took into account
not only player ability, but also “conduct, both on and off the field.”
Ward, who had already established himself as his generation’s
most outspoken critic of baseball’s
distinctive labor practices, saw the
plan as an affront to the players.
What made working as a professional ballplayer different from any
other occupation was the “reserve
clause,” a provision in player contracts under which an owner could
“reserve” a number of players when
the term of their contracts ended.
The clause prohibited the player
from negotiating with another team
unless his team released him. As
professional baseball was controlled
by an agreement between the teams
under which each team agreed to
respect the player contracts of other teams, the reserved player faced
three options: sign a new contract
at the terms dictated by the owner;
hold out and hope for better terms;
or stop playing baseball. Owners
defended the reserve clause as es-
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sential to ensuring the stability of
the game. It did indeed further this
goal. But there was another reason,
one they didn’t trumpet so proudly: it kept down player salaries. And
here too it was effective. In the late
1880s, as club profits tripled, player
salaries grew by only 30 percent, a
fact at least partly attributable to the
reserve system.
In 1887, Ward had a scathing attack on the reserve clause, titled “Is
the Base-Ball Player a Chattel?” He
compared the reserve clause to “a fugitive-slave law”: it “denies [the player] a harbor or a livelihood, and carries him back, bound and shackled,
to the club from which he attempted
to escape.” The remedy, according to
Ward, was simple: get rid of “baseball law” and allow “the business of
base-ball to be made to rest on the
ordinary business basis.”

48

Then & Now: Stories of Law and Progress

When he learned of the owners’
classification plan, Ward was so incensed he threatened to abandon the
world tour to come home and confront the owners. (The news that the
Giants were trying to trade him only
added to his frustration.) He suspected that Spalding had planned the
entire trip just to get him and some
of his allies out of the country in order to go forward with their plans.
If this was indeed Spalding’s plan
(and there is no evidence it was), it
backfired, as the tour ended up giving some of the game’s top players
long hours to share their grievances.
The plan for the baseball revolution
that would upend the game in 1890
might very well have been hatched
in quiet conversation among the
players while on Spalding’s world
tour. Nearly all the players on the
tour would join Ward’s revolt against
the National League.
During the 1889 season, Ward
began preparations for the creation
of a rival major league, the Players
League. Working in secret (he was,
after all, still on the enemy’s payroll),
he found financial backing and convinced many of his fellow players
to commit to the new league. Some
aspects of the Players League looked
familiar. The players were familiar—the new league lured many of
the best National League players to
its rosters. And the cities in which
they played were familiar—the seven cities in which their eight teams
played were all cities that already

had National League teams. But the
business model behind the Players
League was radically different from
anything that had come before.
Each club was run by an eight-man
board, consisting of four players and
four investors. The league was governed by a senate-like organization,
with two representatives from each
team (one elected by players, one by
owners). Players had three-year contracts, and no reserve clause. Investors were promised the first $10,000
of each club’s net profit, with the rest
to be divided among the players.
Spalding and the National League
attacked the Players League. First,
they turned to the courts: the Giants
sued Ward for breach of contract.
Ward had violated the terms of his
reserve clause, they claimed, and
they asked a New York state court
to issue an injunction prohibiting
Ward from playing for anyone else.
The court denied the injunction. As
the reserve clause failed to specify
such essentials as Ward’s salary and
the terms of the renewed contract,
the judge concluded that it was too
indefinite to be treated as a binding contract for the 1890 season.
The court also raised the disturbing
question of whether, assuming the
reserve clause were read to constitute a binding contract for the following season, the renewed contract
would also include a reserve clause.
If so, the player would be tied to his
current team for as long as the team
desired, while the team could release
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a player with only 10 days’ notice.
This was rather absurd, according
to the judge. “We have the spectacle
presented of a contract which binds
one party for a series of years and
the other party for 10 days, and of
the party who is itself bound for ten
days coming into a court of equity to
enforce its claims against the party
bound for years.” The judge concluded that the reserve clause was unenforceable for “want of fairness and of
mutuality.”
With the courts refusing to help,
Spalding turned to public opinion.
He pulled out all the rhetorical stops.
What the players were doing was
“secession,” a “revolt,” a “war”; the
National League was confronting
“hot headed anarchists” who were
leading a “revolutionary movement.”
But the fall of the Players League
after just one season came not from
Spalding’s attacks in the press, nor
from legal challenges. It came from
the marketplace. The new league
had the best players, but this was not
enough. With three major leagues
competing for a limited fan base,
everyone suffered at the gate. At
season’s end, when Spalding opened
negotiations with Players League investors, he pointedly excluded Ward
and any other players. “[T]he monied men met with the monied men,”
as Spalding put it. The National League
owners simply bought out their
competition; several Players League
clubs were integrated into a reconfigured National League. Ward’s rev-
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olution was over.
Ward returned to the National
League, where he played four more
seasons. He was still one of the best
players in the league when he retired
in 1894. He went on to be a successful lawyer, a gentleman farmer, and
a top amateur golfer. Although he
mended fences with organized baseball, his passion for the cause he had
led never left him. In 1925, shortly
before his death, he gave a speech—
at an event to celebrate the National
League, of all places—recounting
the events of 1888–1890 in which he
made clear that the war against the
National League, while doomed, was
justified.

F

or a brief moment, the Players
League presented a radical alternative business model for professional sports, one in which the players and owners shared control of the
game as well as its profits. With the
failure of Ward’s baseball revolution,
the owner-dominated system lived
on. In the following decades, various
teams would go to court to have the
reserve clause enforced against players who had jumped their contracts
(a relatively common occurrence
any time there was a rival league that
refused to abide by the agreement
that controlled the baseball monopoly). Judges, with only the rarest of
exceptions, sided with the players,
often citing Ward’s case as authority on the matter. The reserve clause
lived on, however, and it did so be-
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cause the baseball monopoly, while
periodically challenged, remained in
place. As long as owners respected
the contracts of their on-the-field
competitors, they did not need the
courts. For this reason, the most
significant legal challenges to baseball’s unique labor practices came in
the realm of antitrust, not contract
law. But baseball law survived this
challenge too, as the United States
Supreme Court granted, and then
twice reaffirmed, that federal antitrust law did not apply to professional baseball.
When change eventually came in
the 1970s, it was at the hands of another organized players movement,
but this time it was achieved not
through a rival league but through
labor negotiations (with a critical assist from a sympathetic arbiter). Today, major league baseball operates
in a way that has some similarities
to the core premise of the alternative
model Ward had offered. The game
is governed, in large part, through
collective bargaining agreements between players and owners. With the
skyrocketing of player salaries after

the fall of the reserve clause, the game’s
profits are far more evenly distributed between players and owners.
It took almost a century, but John
Montgomery Ward’s vision for major league baseball has, in some part,
been realized. ◆
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